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BOOK REVIEW
THE RATIONALIST TRADITION AT TRIAL
JAMES L. KAINEN *
Analysis of Evidence: How To Do Things With Facts Based On Wigmore's Science of Judicial Proof, By Terence Anderson** and William
Twining*** (with an Appendix on Probability and Proof by Philip
Dawid****). Little, Brown and Company, and London: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Ltd., 1991. Pp. 457. $22.00. (Teacher's Manual.
Pp. 181)
As Professors Anderson and Twining report, evidence scholars extending the field beyond its traditional focus on doctrinal analysis have
split into two camps. On one hand, there are the "logical atomists."
Their work emphasizes the science of rational inference and is represented, primarily, by research into probability theory, decision theory,
and the uses and misuses of statistics in fact finding. On the other hand,
there are the "narrative holists." Their work emphasizes the cognitive
dimension of fact finding and is represented by research into the role that
narrative plays in ordering fact finders' responses to proof. According to
the narrative holists, these responses cannot be captured by such constructs as "Bayes nets" and "influence diagrams," about which most
judges, juries, lawyers-and evidence teachers, for that matter-remain
ignorant. 1
Should the law of evidence be understood as an application of the techniques of logical analysis and the science of rational inference to the
problem of resolving disputed issues of fact, as the logical atomists would
have it? Or should the law of evidence be understood to define a culturally specific ritual in which disputed issues of fact are resolved by the
choice of competing narratives whose appeal rests on their conformity to
the stories that we tell to make sense of experience, as viewed by the
narrative holists? Anderson and Twining's Analysis of Evidence may be
understood as an extended-albeit indirect-response to these
questions.2
Analysis of Evidence attempts to bridge the schism between the two
Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
Quain Professor of Jurisprudence, University College, London.
**** Professor of Statistics, University College, London.
1. See T. Anderson & W. Twining, Analysis of Evidence: How to Do Things with
Facts Based on Wigmore's Science of JudicialProof94-104 (hereinafter Analysis of Evidence); Anderson, Refocussing the New Evidence Scholarship, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 783
(1991).
2. See Analysis of Evidence, supra note 1, at 167-68; see also Anderson, Refocussing
the New Evidence Scholarship, supra note 1, at 783-85.
*
**
***
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camps by embracing both approaches in what the authors describe as the
"rationalist tradition" underlying both the development and the critique
of the law of evidence. Central to that tradition is the belief that "the
rectitude of decision," measured by the knowable truth value of propositions about past facts deemed important by the substantive law, is a central (although not the only) component of justice. In more complete
form, Anderson and Twining argue that the prescriptive model of adjudication consistent with the rationalist tradition may be summarized by the
following elements:
[1] The direct end [2] of adjective law [3] is rectitude of decision
through correct application [4] of valid substantive laws [5] deemed to
be consonant with utility (or otherwise good) [6] and through accurate
determination [7] of the true past facts [8] material to [9] precisely
specified allegations expressed in categories defined in advance by law
i.e. facts in issue [10] proved to specified standards of probability or
likelihood [11] on the basis of the careful [12] and rational [13] weighing of [14] evidence [15] which is both relevant [16] and reliable [17]
presented (in a form designed to bring out truth and discover untruth)
[18] to supposedly competent [19] and impartial [20] decision-makers
[21] with adequate safeguards against corruption [22] and mistake [23]
and adequate provision for review and appeal.
The authors, of course, add the caveat that the "pursuit of truth... [is to
be given] a high, but not necessarily an overriding, priority [in relation to
other values]." 5
With their model of rationalist adjudication in hand, Anderson and
Twining set out to accommodate both the logical atomists and the narrative holists by demonstrating the existence of a science of proof that, unlike at least some suggested uses of probability theory, fits squarely
within the accepted common-law framework for fact finding at trial. The
procedure that they adopt for developing a science of proof that can incorporate the two approaches results in a book that is as remarkable as is
the collaboration between two authors. Professor Twining, an eminent
English Professor of Jurisprudence and biographer of American legal realist Karl Llewellyn, 6 originally approached the reconstruction of the rationalist tradition in evidence from the perspective of a lifetime of study
of legal theory rather than litigation experience. Professor Twining's
work thus originally emphasized the rationalist tradition in evidence
scholarship.' In Analysis of Evidence, however, he surrenders that focus
3. Analysis of Evidence, supra note 1, at 94-104.
4. Id. at 98-99. The assumptions underlying the model are also usefully explored in
the same section.
5. Id. at 96.
6. See W. Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (1973).
7. See W. Twining, The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship, in Well and
Truly Tried (E. Campbell & L. Waller eds. 1982); W. Twining, Theories of Evidence:
Bentham and Wigmore (1985) (hereinafter Theories of Evidence); W. Twining, Rethinking Evidence (1990).
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to collaborate with a litigator. Professor Anderson is a highly accomplished practitioner and clinician whose credits include the defense of
former United States District Judge Alcee Hastings in his impeachment
trial before the United States Senate' and experience litigating landlord/
tenant cases in the District of Columbia as the courts were reaching the
landmark decisions that still form the core of treatments of leasehold
estates in first year property classes.9 Together, they probe the notion of
a rationalist tradition by putting it to what is perhaps its most exacting
test.
Rather than defend the philosophic premises of the rationalist tradition, Anderson and Twining attempt to vindicate that tradition by emphasizing its utility in teaching the elusive skill of fact analysis. Given
this perspective, one can hardly dispute their claim that, even conceding
that the elements of the rationalist tradition express debatable first principles, these elements nonetheless "provide a basis for constructing arguments to persuade a court that the construction urged is the construction
most consistent with the assumptions upon which the system is based."'"
Moreover, although Anderson and Twining apparently intend this observation to apply to the process of persuading a judge about the construction of evidence law, their book abundantly demonstrates that it is
equally applicable to the process of persuading a fact finder about the
appropriate construction of evidence. Insofar as the process of persuading the fact finder is itself logical-and our practices clearly presuppose
that it is and that it should be-Anderson and Twining note that" 'holistic' synthesis and 'atomistic' analysis are complementary, and the tools
involved are all necessary parts of the equipment of professional
litigators." 1
The basis for Anderson and Twining's science of proof is found in
John Henry Wigmore's The Science of JudicialProofas Given by Logic,
2
Psychology, and GeneralExperience, and Illustratedin Judicial Trials.'

Wigmore is, of course, best known for his contributions to the rules of
evidence. But as Anderson and Twining remind us, Wigmore himself
saw those rules of admissibility as "merely a preliminary aid to the main
activity, viz., the persuasion of the tribunal's mind to a correct conclusion."' 3 Thus, to Wigmore, the rules of evidence are, and always will be,
secondary to the principles of proof that "represent the natural processes
8. See 135 Cong. Rec. S3292 (April 4, 1989).
9. See, e.g., Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968) and
its progeny. See also Golphin v. Park Monroe Assoc., 353 A.2d 314 (D.C. Ct. App.
1976).
10. Analysis of Evidence, supra note 1, at 95
11. Id at 169.
12. (3rd ed. 1937).
13. Analysis of Evidence, supra note 1, at 49 (quoting J. Wigmore, The Science of
Judicial Proof §§ 1-2 (1937)); see also Theories of Evidence, supra note 7, at 109-66 (com-

mentary on Wigmore's development of the principles of proof and the publication history
of The Science of Judicial Proof).
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of the mind in dealing with the evidential facts after they are admitted to
the jury... so long as trials
remain as a rational attempt to seek the truth
' 4
in legal controversies."'
Although adopting Wigmore's stance on the existence and priority of
principles of proof, Anderson and Twining are quick to acknowledge
that they retain only his core emphasis on the logical structure of proof
that they and have jettisoned his grand attempt to codify forensic psychology, forensic science, and general experience into an empirical science of proof."5 In the first place, as the authors note, many of the
findings of Wigmore's science have been superseded. 6 Moreover, Anderson and Twining also properly seem to have abandoned Wigmore's
hope that knowledge developed through scientific findings and ordinary
observations of experience will allow meaningful codification. Perhaps
the best known manifestation of this idea was Wigmore's notion of legal,
as opposed to logical, relevancy. Wigmore believed that evidentiary
precedents would amount to a fund of rules, responsive to observed uniformities in behavior, that would render ad hoc appeals to logic and experience unnecessary in deciding upon the relevance of evidence. But his
insistence that legally relevant evidence possess some "plus value" beyond mere logical relevance has all but vanished in modem codifications
that uniformly adopt the standard of logical rather than legal relevance. 7 Anderson and Twining, in their treatment of Wigmore's science, have "Llewellynized" him, as they put it.' 8 What remains of
Wigmore's science is the logic of proof that Anderson and Twining refine
and convey in order to help one "master . . . a set of techniques for
organizing a mass of evidentiary material (macroscopic analysis) and for
constructing, reconstructing, and appraising in a rigorous and detailed
way the key phases of complex arguments (microscopic analysis) based
upon the evidence in a case." 9
I suspect that most evidence teachers will be sympathetic to Anderson
and Twining's effort to systematize the teaching of the logic of proof
without necessarily starting down the road to "Bayes nets" and "influence diagrams." 2 ° My guess is that almost all of us recognize, to one
degree or another, the primacy of the principles of proof over the rules of
evidence, and that the effective teaching of the latter presupposes some
14. Analysis of Evidence, supra note 1, at 50 (quoting J. Wigmore, The Science of
Judicial Proof §§ 1-2 (1937)).
15. Id. at 47-48 n.1.
16. See id. at 47-48.
17. See C. Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick, Evidence Under the Rules (1988), at 69 (discussing Wigmore's notion of legal relevancy and its rejection in modem evidence law).
18. See Analysis of Evidence, supra note 1, at xxvii.
19. Id. at 47-48 n.l.
20. Those inclined towards similar constructs will not be entirely disappointed. The
book contains a highly readable appendix on probability and proof written by a distinguished statistician. It provides an excellent framework for discussing the uses and misuses of statistical proof and for educating even the mathematically illiterate about
probability theory.
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understanding of the former. For example, students must appreciate the
various kinds of inferences that may be drawn from facts to adequately
understand, rules about hearsay, best evidence, or limited admissibility.
However, what of those students who are lost in the brief introductory
section on the concepts of relevance, probative value, and prejudicial effect, in which we take the time to map out chains of inferences from
facts? Most of us do very little overt teaching of the principles of proof
for reasons apart from the shortness of time. In no other course, perhaps, does the desire to achieve coverage serve as a more convenient excuse. Suppose we were to teach the principles of proof appropriate to our
evidential jurisprudence; what would we say?
Analysis of Evidence directly answers this question by making it apparent that there is, indeed, much to say. The authors begin by providing a
lucid description of concepts essential to thinking about the processes of
proof, such as induction, deduction, abduction, and inference. Building
upon Wigmore, they also provide a refined vocabulary2 to guide the student in thinking about the steps involved in constructing proof from "evidence that will be perceived by the tribunal through one of its senses"
(for which the authors adopt Wigmore's term "autoptic proference").
Additionally, the authors proffer their own vocabulary for thinking
about the ways in which evidentiary propositions may combine: conjunction, compound propositions, corroboration, convergence, and catenate inferences. Again, their clear discussion well serves their purpose
of helping students learn to recognize arguments that can logically be
made from a mass of evidence as a prelude to assessing the strengths and
weaknesses of specific arguments.
More generally, the vocabulary introduced by the authors facilitates
requiring students to think critically about why they may find particular
items of evidence to be more or less probative. Perhaps more importantly, it provides a way to cause them to rethink their first impressions
about the relative strength of pieces of evidence. If accepted judicial
practice and classroom responses are an accurate guide, beginning evidence students' first impressions about the strength of various inferences
are as likely as not to be "wrong" when measured against routine
practices.
In what amounts to the heart of the book, Anderson and Twining apply the vocabulary that they have introduced to a "chart method" of
21. Since the book uses many terms that are likely to be unfamiliar to the reader, it
contains a glossary that serves as a convenient means of referring back to basic definitions. See id. at 443-49. The core terms used are: factum probans, a factual proposition
offered as support for a further inferred proposition;factumprobandum, a proposition to
be proved; interim probandum, a proposition to be proved which will support or negate,
either directly or indirectly, an ultimate issue as part of a chain of inferences; penultimate
probanda, simple propositions such as an element of a crime or claim or defense; and
ultimate probandum, the ultimate issue which must be established or negated in order to
prevail in a case. See id.
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analyzing the evidence in any particular dispute.2 2 Again, they begin
with Wigmore's contribution. Next, they present a modified (and somewhat simplified) version of the "Wigmorian" chart as a way of mapping
the evidence in any particular dispute. To construct such a chart, they
utilize a "palette" of symbols that signify the types of evidence employed,
the inferential relationships between items of evidence, and the non-evidentiary generalizations (about circumstances or experience) that are
central to the parties' arguments. The symbols are accompanied by numbers, each of which corresponds to an evidentiary proposition that appears on a key-list of such propositions. Ideally, each such proposition is
simple enough to be "susceptible to the response 'true/false,' or 'proven/

not proven.'

"23

As a result, the final product will graphically illustrate the many logical steps that the advocate is inviting a fact finder to take while reasoning
along the path from "autoptic proference" to ultimate probandum.24
The chart/key-list will clearly delineate, for example, testimonial assertions; inferred propositions; evidence providing alternative explanations
for inferences proposed by the other side; evidence corroborating proposed inferences; facts that the tribunal will judicially notice or accept
without evidential support; and generalizations that are likely to play a
significant role in a case but which are not propositions to be proved. 25
The chart will also identify the inter-relationships among all the anticipated items of proof.26 As a whole, the chart and key-list will depict
both the central evidentiary propositions upon which the advocate relies
and the logical relationship among them.
As Anderson and Twining realize, some will undoubtedly find the process of charting a case-at first blush, at least-to be more tedious than
illuminating. Accordingly, they set out in truncated form what they call
narrative and outline methods for analyzing proof.27 In fact it is difficult
to see how these approaches in their hands amount to different methods
at all. Perhaps, however, that is their point about the utility of the charting exercise. They argue that regardless of the final form adopted for
presenting a complete analysis of the facts, the logical processes used to
arrive at the content of the chart, narrative summary, or outline are essentially the same. For example, they note-correctly in my view-that
"[t]he nature of closing argument is to reassure the fact-finder that the
evidence 'logically' makes one story the most plausible and to focus its
attention on the inconsistencies and logical fallacies in the opponent's
'28
story in relation to the central legal principles laid down by the judge."
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See id. at 108-55.
Id. at 125.
See supra note 21.
See id. at 145-46.
See id. at 145.
See id. at 155-72.
Id. at 169.
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Thus, the chart itself is more a tool than a method: regardless of how
one chooses to depict the results of factual analysis-on a chart, or in
narrative or outline form-one should have performed the inferential
analysis suggested by the exercise of charting a key-list of evidentiary
propositions in Wigmorian fashion. If the tedium stems from thinking
through the content of the chart rather than executing it in final form,
then I think it safe to say that the fault lies with the student rather than
the "method."
A critique more likely to be voiced by experienced fact analysts is that
the charting process is unnecessary because it unduly formalizes that
which is intuitive. Nonetheless, I trust that those of us who have had the
hunibling experience of teaching evidence-even to very bright students-will recognize the error in that critique. It is true that the reasoning process formalized in the chart method will be second nature to
experienced fact analysts. That it has become second nature to experienced evidence teachers or practitioners, however, does not mean that
the skill is intuitive. I would liken learning the analysis of evidence that
Anderson and Twining are seeking to teach to learning a language: one
can learn a language by immersing oneself in surroundings where it is
spoken rather than receiving any kind of formal training, and in that very
limited sense one may think of the ability to acquire language as intuitive. But for only a very few will the process of actually learning to communicate not be accelerated and enhanced by receiving formal
instruction in grammar. The intuitions of an experienced fact analyst,
which she may perceive as second nature, are far more likely to reflect a
painstaking, albeit informal, education.
It is particularly important that law schools join Anderson and Twining in their attempt to incorporate the skill of fact analysis within the
traditional classroom curriculum. Too often, whatever fact analysis is
taught by law schools is left to clinical courses taught by practitioners
who learned that skill by a mixture of observation and trial and error. It
is natural that, to those who have successfully learned a language
through experiential exposure, formal training will appear unnecessary, if
not entirely a waste of time. Therefore, it is understandable that they are
likely to replicate their own training in their teaching, if not to be outright hostile to the attempt to formalize instruction in fact analysis.
Nonetheless, the kind of rigorous analysis of facts made easily accessible
by the Wigmorian chart/key-list might well help even experienced practitioner/teachers understand what they have learned and, thus, improve
their ability to communicate it to students. After all, practitioner/teachers likely to think of the skill of fact analysis as intuitive always seem to
be at a loss to explain why it is that their intuition seems to consistently
serve them well, while the intuition of their beginning students always
seems to come up short.
The ultimate test of the utility of the Wigmorian chart lies in the actual exercises that the authors have carefully assembled. Interspersed
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with the textual materials are a series of exercises that lead up to the
students charting the evidence in several hypothetical and real cases that
are either developed in stages or presented in the form of substantially
complete case files or trial records.2 9 The case materials themselves are
worth the price of the book. They provide abundant opportunities for
making students appreciate the importance of clearly formulating probanda and reasoning out the inferential relationship between items of evidence and the ultimate probandum. Rigorous analysis of the cases and
problems provided should dispel any misunderstanding by students, no
less than some of their professors, that fact analysis is simply a matter of
common sense or intuition. If the students analyze the evidence in the
cases developed in the materials in response to the questions and exercises suggested by the authors, it is difficult to imagine that they will not
begin to understand the analysis of evidence in precisely the way that
their professors hope that they will, but too often leave to chance.
The most difficult question posed by Analysis of Evidence is how to
best use it within the confines of the traditional law school curriculum.
Following Wigmore's own example at Northwestern and his suggestion
about the priority of the principles of proof over the rules of evidence, the
authors suggest that the book may be used in a variety of ways, including
as the text in a course on proof that precedes the course on the rules of
evidence.3 0 There is much to be said for this approach. The rigorous
analysis of evidentiary propositions and inferences is itself extremely useful in understanding and evaluating the rationales for the rules and, thus,
learning them in this way facilitates understanding of both how they can
be used and how they impact on the structure of proof. For example,
even a rudimentary understanding of the authors' conception of fact
analysis would facilitate the teaching of such concepts as limited admissibility, unfair prejudice, hearsay, and relevance. I suspect that a minicourse in proof is already the theme, even in traditional evidence classes,
where the discussion of the admissibility of any piece of evidence begins
with the question "Why is it relevant?" and proceeds from there.
On the other hand, the materials themselves belie the utility of teaching the principles of proof apart from the rules of evidence. Many of the
best exercises designed by the authors presuppose some knowledge of the
rules of evidence. Additionally, the charting exercise is enhanced by undertaking it within the context provided by the rules. If the authors are
correct about their claim to a rationalist tradition in evidence law, many
of the uses of proof whose understanding is facilitated by the charting
process will also be illuminated by the rules. In addition, those not fully
convinced of the benefits of teaching the science of proof will undoubtedly find the Wigmorian chart useful, because it helps to teach the rules
29. See id. at 62-63, 173-250.
30. See id. at xxiv, xxvii.
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by graphically illustrating the inferential structure of proof which the
rules both respond to and help to create.
The difficulty in developing a framework in which to make best use of
the materials in Analysis of Evidence is reflected in the teacher's manual,
which is less an integrated approach to the materials than it is a running
commentary on how the authors use, or have used them, in different
ways. For this reason, the manual, although filled with interesting ideas
and suggestions, is less useful than it could have been. I fear that a
teacher interested in developing a course on proof or fact analysis will
not find that her decision on the selection of a text is made any easier by
the existence of the manual. By the same token, an evidence teacher who
is inclined to include more proof in the standard evidence course at the
expense of coverage of the rules of evidence is likely to find that prospect
no less daunting by virtue of the manual. Unfortunately, it reads more
like a series of relatively idiosyncratic suggestions about how to use the
materials than a finished package.
Part of the problem may be the fact that the manual attempts to incorporate the various ways in the which the materials have been used by
both authors to teach different audiences, including undergraduates as
well as law students. I suspect, however, that the problem of integrating
the materials may also be more substantive. In resurrecting the
Wigmorian principles of proof, the authors seem to perceive their mission as counterbalancing the traditional emphasis on the rules of evidence by insisting upon the existence of a separate, neglected science of
proof. In fact, however, a major contribution of the book seems to me its
validation of the continuity between the principles of proof and the rules
of evidence as they have developed within the common-law framework
for resolving disputes. The authors might, therefore, have focused more
on establishing the intimate connection between the rules of evidence and
the principles of proof than on attempting to prove the existence of a
forgotten science.
One way to approach the problem of integration might have been to
concentrate, in the more theoretical portions of the book, as is done in
the more practical, on the standpoint of the trial lawyer. While the trial

lawyer's perspective dominates the exercises, it tends to get slighted in
the textual material that does not directly address trial preparation or
presentation. Yet, adopting this consistent perspective throughout the
book seems to me to hold much promise as a vehicle for integrating the
study of the principles of proof and the rules of evidence. In preparing a
case for trial, for example, an advocate must be acutely aware that everything she does in the courtroom should be conceived as a form of persuasion directed to two audiences. Given the elements of the rationalist
tradition that the authors describe, the fact finder must be persuaded that
the desired verdict is the logical outcome of the evaluation of the proof.
Simultaneously, the judge must be persuaded that the proof necessary to
reach the desired verdict comports with the rules of evidence. Planning a
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case, therefore, is an exercise in integrating forms of persuasion appropriate to both audiences, who are evaluating it from different perspectives a
For example, while the jury is hearing from a witness that an automobile
accident must have been a horrible, startling event that riveted the attention of passersby, the judge is "hearing" that the witness is about to relate an excited utterance made by a bystander at the scene of the accident
who, given the circumstances, must have been reporting his personal
knowledge of the cause of the crash.
Attending to both perspectives, moreover, is mutually enhancing. The
advocate who understands the rationale of the hearsay rule a2 and its excited utterance exception 3 3 is now also better prepared to make arguments addressing the probative value of the evidence as well as its
admissibility. More generally, the advocate who understands both the
rules of evidence and the principles of proof as applications of the rationalist tradition to the problem of resolving factual disputes fairly and accurately will be better prepared to approach what is, perhaps, the
advocate's ultimate task-persuading both the fact-finder and the judge
that the desired verdict is consistent with the aspirations reflected in that
tradition.
Similar connections between evidence law and the principles of proof
might also have been emphasized by focusing on aspects of the trial process that tend to be excluded in traditional evidence courses. These are
similarly slighted in Anderson and Twining's discussion of the principles
of proof. Standard jury instructions about how a jury should evaluate
proof generally (such as credibility instructions) and how it should evaluate specific types of proof (such as cautionary instructions) provide a
ready vehicle for exploring beliefs about how fact finders ideally should
evaluate evidence and assumptions underlying beliefs about how they are
likely to do so. 34 Effective persuasion in the context of presenting a case
for trial should incorporate these beliefs and assumptions into the structure of the advocate's argument. What may first appear as an irrational
verdict by a jury given "the facts," for example, may often reflect an
effective job of persuasion about how the fact finder should understand
its role in holding, say, the prosecution in a criminal case to the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of precisely specified allegations. As Anderson and Twining would, I think, concede, persuasion
about the appropriate conception of the fact finder's role in the context of
3 1. Put otherwise, both points referred to in the text must be "proved" to the relevant
audience.
32. See Fed. R. Evid. 802.
33. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2).
34. Similarly, standard and proposed jury instructions about the elements of a crime,
cause of action, or defense could also serve to focus the process of formulating penultimate and ultimateprobanda. See supra note 21. Because a student may have some difficulty grasping the notion of the relationship between afactum probans and probandum,
see id., it might be easier to teach by showing how jury instructions frame the question(s)
to which his evidence must provide the desired answer.
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the case is as much a part of the rationalist tradition as is "scientific"
evaluation of the evidence to discover the "true facts."
Fully developing the persuasion approach to fact analysis through
adoption of the trial lawyer's perspective would probably carry the risk
of confusing Analysis of Evidence with a trial practice manual, which it
most decidedly is not. Nonetheless, the risk could have been worth it.
Utilizing the trial lawyer's perspective in order to teach the rigorous
analysis of facts crystallizes two points that seem to me to be central to
the substantial contribution to the theoretical literature on proof that
Anderson and Twining have made in Analysis of Evidence.
First, the book demonstrates that the extent to which the law of evidence is about the science of rational inference is itself a question that is
up for grabs within the rationalist model of adjudication as Anderson and
Twining conceive it. Indeed, insofar as advocates properly emphasize
different elements within that tradition as part of the process of persuasion, the question posed at the beginning of this review may itself be seen
as part of the contest in any given "factual" dispute. The rules of evidence and their associated principles of proof are drawn from the rationalist tradition of common-law adjudication at the same time they
participate in its evolution. The rules and principles are, thus, both descriptive and prescriptive: they amount to a "grammar" of persuasion
that describes how the process of persuasion in fact occurs and how that
progress simultaneously serves as a basis for evaluating particular findings. Perhaps the notion of a "logic" or "science" of proof is ultimately
misleading if one thinks of logic and science in their modem sense as
aspiring to universality and objectivity. Instead, the principles of proof
and the rules of evidence may better be conceived as part of what Roberto Unger has called a "dogmatic, interpretative, or symbolic discipline,"3 5 like grammar, whose aspirations are unavoidably normative
and, hence, different from those of modem empirical science. In this
view, the rationalist tradition can accommodate the narrative holists and
logical atomists precisely because it purports to account for fact finding
within our particular legal system rather than in some universal or objective sense.
Second, the principles of proof that emerge from learning that tradition-although more akin to principles of classical rhetoric than to findings of modem empirical science-are indeed as central to our legal
order as any other legal principles. Thus, their study deserves a place in
the law school curriculum as exalted as that currently afforded the study
of the rules of evidence. One may disagree with Anderson and Twining
about whether it is more likely that the principles of proof will achieve
that status through emphasis on their uniqueness or their continuity
with, and dependency upon, the traditional course on the rules of evidence. But however one approaches that question, this book should
35. See R. Unger, Knowledge and Politics 111 (Free Press: 1975).
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cause us to consider not only how the skill of fact analysis should be
taught, but also whether the standpoint of the trial lawyer should become
as familiar to second-year law students as the standpoint of the appellate
lawyer is to first-year law students. Were that to happen, I suspect that
we might reconsider a number of boundaries that currently structure the
law school curriculum, such as the distinction between clinical and classroom education. In the meantime, we can all enhance our teaching of
evidence by incorporating the approach to proof embodied in Analysis of
Evidence.
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